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Through the generosity of a Rockefeller Archive Research Grant, I made my 
second visit to the RAC during the week of 27 October 2002.  It was a busy but 
rewarding week of research, and I am deeply grateful to the center for its continuing 
support of my research on “Power, Toil, and Trouble:  The Nature of Industrial Struggle 
in the Colorado Coalfields through the Ludlow Massacre of 1914. 
This research report will briefly survey the materials I used during this visit, then 
delve more deeply into two phases of the coalfield war and its aftermath as illuminated 
by some of these documents. 
I began the week by perusing what remains of the papers of Frederick T. Gates.  
This seems to be just a remnant of a much larger body of material, a supposition that 
anecdotal evidence within the Gates papers confirms.  That said, a few interesting letters 
remain from LaMont Montgomery Bowers, the Rockefellers' man at the Colorado Fuel & 
Iron Company (CF&I) and Gates' nephew, documenting Bowers' disdain for his new 
associates and his confidence in his ability to serve the Rockefellers well.  “My forty 
years of activity,” Bowers wrote not long after accepting the task of turning around the 
western company in 1907, “has become too fixed in my mind and muscles flesh and 
bones to tolerate indolence, so I am like a fish out of water here.”  Despite his age, 
Bowers believed “that I can do more good head work and handle matters requiring 
thought and good judgment better than at any time in my business life.  I am more 
inclined to come to conclusions slowly perhaps, but this improves rather than lessens the 
quality of my work, for I am inclined to reach the end of the argument right on the spot 
and always have acted in that way, but doing business with corporations where we have 
to deal with representatives who may not be able to close a matter, has toned down my 
naturally rapid way of doing things and to my advantage too I think.  So I think like 
whiskey (though always bad) I improve with age in smoothness and effectiveness.”
1
  
In addition to these exchanges, the Gates papers also include drafts of essays 
apparently written by Gates on such weighty topics as “Competition vs Cooperation” and 
“Capital and Labor.”  These essays provide important insights into Gates' struggle to 
reconcile his compassion for the plight of those less fortunate than himself, with a 
political ideology that led him to oppose trade unionism bitterly and absolutely.  Gates 
could approve neither “the spirit, the principle [n]or the methods” of labor organizations.  
At the same time, though, he excoriated his readers that “[T]he differences between the 
poor and the rich, the laborer and the capitalist,” Gates proclaimed, are “due not to 
heredity but to environment.”  He used photos of British coal miners to argue that “The 
blood that courses in their veins is just as pure, just as rich and probably better than that 
of most of the aristocracy.  It is because they have been living from childhood and 
working from childhood in the mines.  . . .  Shall we hate and despise and look down 
upon these people whom our social system has made that [sic] they are, or shall we pity 
them and shall we blame ourselves for having made them what they are, for keeping them 
where they are, and for clothing ourselves with the fruits of their unpaid labor?”  One 
could find few better statements of the environmentalist notions that underpinned welfare 
capitalism than Gates' statement that “These poor wretched miners, these uncouth, ill 
formed, brutal people that you despise, have been made what they are by the conditions 
of their lives.  It is nonsense, it is subterfuge, it is false, scientifically false, historically 
false, false by observation, that they belong to a lower order of beings.  They are the 
same flesh and blood as ourselves.  They are what we ourselves would be under their 
conditions, and we are what they would be under our conditions.  It is for us who have 
                                                 
1  Bowers to Gates, 18 October 1907, folder 14, box 1, Frederick T. Gates Papers, Rockefeller 
Archive Center, Pocantico Hills, NY. 
means,” Gates concluded, “not to resist the claims of these people for a larger portion  It 
is for us to say, yes, my stocks - let them be reduced to two per cent; my bonds - let them 
go down to two per cent instead of five; give the balance to these people.  Cut down their 
hours of labor.  Improve their living conditions.  Give them opportunities for music, for 
pictures, for whatever can cultivate them in mind, whatever can beautify and adorn them 
in body.  Let us ourselves share to some extent the manual labor of the world, and instead 
of a few rising to the top on the backs of the many, let us undertake up [sic] build up 
society in all uts [sic] parts as a whole to a higher level.”
2
  If surviving documents are any 
indication, Gates would express no such compassion toward Colorado coal miners when 
they went on strike in 1913.  In a statement written one month after the Ludlow 
Massacre, and credited to him by Raymond Fosdick in a draft passage of his biography of 
JDR, Jr. and subsequently struck out, the lynchpin of the Rockefeller family's 
humanitarian operations fumed that “I am unable to take any other view of the situation 
that the officers of the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company are standing between the country 
and chaos, anarchy, proscription and confiscation, and in so doing are worthy the support 
of every man who loves his country or his kind.  Our country confronts only one danger.  
That danger is not combination of capital, it is not the Mexican situation, it is the labor 
monopoly; and the danger of the labor monopoly lies in its use of armed force, its 
organized and deliberate war on society.”
3  Gates evidently believed that individual 
miners who quietly went about their work deserved to be pitied and uplifted by the 
wealthy, while organized, militant miners posed a threat to civilization itself.  He even 
opposed the so-called Rockefeller Plan of reconciliation developed by JDR, Jr. and 
William Lyon Mackenzie King; “It may be urged that this policy is the Christian policy.  
                                                 
2  "Capital and Labor," n.d., folder 9, box 1, ibid. 
3  Frederick T. Gates, "The Struggle for Industrial Freedom," 20 May 1914, quoted in Raymond 
Fosdick, draft, folder 507, box 58, RG 2, JDR, Jr. Personal, OMR, RAC. 
I do not so understand Christ that he adopted any spirit of conciliation toward those who 
came at him in the spirit of these Unionists.”
4
JDR, Jr.'s desire to ameliorate relationships between CF&I and its workers, 
however, eventually overcame the doubts of his father's old guard.  In addition to the 
Rockefeller Plan (a well-worn topic regarding which I found nothing new of much 
substance), the pair also brought the largesse of the Rockefeller Foundation to bear on the 
unemployment problem created by the strike and a concomitant regional depression.  
Series 200 of the RF papers document this effort, which involved the donation of 
$100,000 from the foundation to highway construction programs in Las Animas County, 
the heart of the southern Colorado coalfields.  When the UMWA officially called off the 
strike in December, 1914, its members no longer received the benefits that had sustained 
them for over a year in southern Colorado, and as long as four years in northern 
Colorado.  In mass meetings, impoverished miners and their families demanded relief 
from state and local officials;
5
 in response, a group of prominent citizens in Trinidad 
contacted the Rockefeller Foundation and Colorado Governor George A. Carlson.  The 
resulting public-private relief effort provided work for between 1,000 and 1,500 men in 
each of the southern field counties of Las Animas and Huerfano, 300-500 in 1000-1500 
familes “in immediate need” in each of LA and Huerfano Counties, and 1150-1900 more 
in other coal-mining regions of the state.
6
  King took pains to insure that relief work 
would be distributed without “discrimination of any kind.  No account whatever is to be 
                                                 
4  Copy of “Colorado Strike Memorandum, January 29, 1915, Gates’ [sic] Papers, Vol. II #21, Vol. 
I, edited by _______” in research notes, folder 480, box 53, ibid.  The document itself no longer 
exists in the RAC's Gates papers; it seems reasonable to assume that there once existed a large 
body of Gates materials which have either been destroyed or remain in private hands. 
5  King claimed that the first appeal for Foundation aid was made at “a mass meeting of men at 
Trinidad, in which appeal it was represented that conditions were desperate, and that the miners 
of Colorado and their wives and children were starving.”  King to JDR, Jr., 26 April 1915, folder 
171, box 16, Series 200, RG 1.1, Rockefeller Foundation (RF) Papers.  See also John Cundy to John 
White, 20 February 1915 in State of Colorado Committee on Unemployment and Relief Report of 
Secretary (Denver:  Smith-Brooks, 1916),  On the situation in Boulder County, see S. A. 
Greenwood to RF, 21 June 1915, folder 171, box 16, RF. 
6  State of Colorado Committee on Unemployment and Relief, 4. 
taken of the worker’s politics, his church affiliation, his membership in a labor union or 
lack of it, or of any similar matter.”
7
  Men who were “residents” of the coalfields and had 
families, however, were to receive first priority (relief workers assumed the others could 
fend for themselves). 
8
 Those hired to work on road crews received 25 cents an hour for 
an eight-hour day, and could work no more than three days a week “to prevent relief 
work,” in King's words, from “competing with or being accepted in lieu of other and 
steady employment.”
9
  In response to a complaint from Jerome Greene of 26 Broadway 
that he devoted too much space in the Foundation's annual report to the relief effort, the 
Canadian rejoined that the campaign “was a very important feature, and much more a 
part of the work which made possible the ultimate adoption of the Industrial 
Representation Plan than the public or any parties to the situation will ever realize.”
10
  
While these files have helped me to understand more about attempts to resolve the 
labor conflict in Colorado, my research in the main body of CF&I business papers at the 
RAC rounded out my understanding of the company's activities leading up to the strike.  I 
had already examined most of the Business Interests papers on the company during my 
first visit, but my work in October and November fleshed out some important issues.  
Most importantly, it improved my understanding of CF&I's business situation during the 
1907-1913 period.  The company faced several problems, from a shortage of railroad cars 
for hauling coal, to difficulties securing orders for rails and rail products, to competition 
from other fuel companies both within and outside of Colorado, to negative press in 
national magazines such as Pearson's and The Survey.
11
  Despite these difficulties, 
though, Bowers' cost-cutting measures (which largely involved purging the ranks of 
                                                 
7King to JDR, Jr., 26 April 1915. 
8  "Committee" to King, 1 April 1915, folder 170, box 16, ibid. 
9  King to JDR., Jr., 26 April 1915. 
10  King to Greene, 19 January 1916, folder 171, box 16, ibid. 
11  On Rockefeller concerns with these press reports, see Gates to Bowers, 8 April 1911 and Starr 
J. Murphy to JDR, Jr., 9 February 1912, folder 190, box 21, CF&I Papers, Business Interests, RG III 
2C, Office of the Messieurs Rockefeller, RAC.   
middle management and introducing stringent economies), turmoil within competing 
firms, and the company's successful switch from a focus on steel made through the 
Bessemer process to open-hearth steel-making ideally suited for the company's ore 
supply together made the company successful enough that Bowers considered resuming 
dividend payments in 1910.
12
  Gates advised JDR, Sr. against this measure; he believed 
that the company should keep this cash in reserve to insure it against future downturns.
13
  
Along with the high dividends paid by CF&I's Colorado Supply Company and other 
subsidiaries, this evidence suggests that while the company was hardly a lucrative 
investment, it was not quite so burdensome as the Rockefellers would later claim during 
investigations of the 1913-'14 strike. 
Bowers and CF&I president Jesse F. Welborn kept 26 Broadway well-informed 
not only about the company's financial performance, but also about the activity of union 
organizers sent into the southern field by the UMWA beginning in 1912.   
Bowers had earlier complained about the $20,000 annual budget for the 
company's detective force, and he may have cut back on the department or eliminated it 
entirely.
14
  The UMWA, though, made no effort to conceal its intentions of organizing 
the southern field, and CF&I retained enough of an intelligence network in its mines to 
know that the union was following through on its public declarations.  Fearing that “The 
compromise between the operators and miners in the bituminous coal states [in the] east, 
together with unusual activity on the part of spies sent out by the Western Federation of 
Miners [Bowers repeatedly conflated the UMWA with the more militant WFM] and their 
activity in endeavoring to unionize our coal mines,” was priming the southern fields for 
unionization, Bowers decided in April, 1912 that the best policy was “to advance our 
miners 5c a ton and day labor in proportion, before they had made any demand.  As you 
                                                 
12  On trouble within Victor-American, see Bowers to Gates, 20 November 1910, folder 190, box 
21, ibid. 
13  Gates to JDR, Sr., 17 June 1910, folder 190, box 21, ibid. 
14  Bowers to Gates, 28 February 1908, folder 187, box 21, ibid. 
know, our mines are non-union, and I know of no better way than to anticipate demands 
and do a little better by the men than they would receive if they belonged to the unions.  
This keeps them in line and reasonable happy.”
15
  Five months later, he wrote JDR, Sr. 
that “Our men are well paid, well housed, and every precaution known taken to prevent 
disaster.  So far as we can learn, they are satisfied and contented, but the constant 
dogging of their heels by agitators, together with the muckraking magazines and trust-
busting political shysters, has a mighty influence over the ignorant foreigners who make 
up the great mass of our ten thousand miners.  Still,” Bowers concluded with guarded but 
misplaced optimism, “everything now seems to be favorable and the outlook good.”
16
   
Such letters from Bowers in the period leading up to the 1913 strike call would 
continue to shape the Rockefellers' view of the conflict until well after the loss of life at 
Ludlow.  Only in the winter of 1914, with Mackenzie King tentatively on-board and Ivy 
Lee providing public relations damage-control, did the family finally lose faith in 
Bowers.
17
  JDR, Sr.'s long-time associate was too intelligent and too irascible not to 
detect abandonment in the family's unsubtle request that he step down as vice-president 
and director of CF&I in January, 1915.  “That there is some underlying reason for this 
move in asking my retirement from every position in that company, after so many years 
of activity,” Bowers wrote JDR Jr. in a pained tone, “is hardly to be doubted.  I assume 
that the nearly twenty years of confidential relationship has made it plain to you, that I do 
nothing under cover and give and take all business matters out into the open, and am not 
happy without perfect confidence and an open mind and heart in all matters that we have 
                                                 
15  Bowers to Gates, 15 April 1912, folder 190, box 21, ibid. 
16  Bowers to JDR, Sr., 30 September 1912, folder 190, box 21, ibid. 
17  Complaints about Bowers began to flow into 26 Broadway from businessmen as well as labor 
leaders and reformers.  A Cleveland railroad and coal executive, for instance, wrote that "I have 
recently asked several prominent Cleveland business men about Bowers, all of whom say he has 
done more in this vicinity (and they think elsewhere) to ‘queer’ Rockefeller than he (R) has been 
able to overcome by his many benefactions. . . .  It is thought here that Bowers has always been 
one of the men upon whom Rockefeller has depended to quite an extent for information of 
various kinds, yet no one who knows Bowers seems to understand why this has been the case 
becauseof his very disagreeable personality.”  W. R. Woodford to George Peck, 15 December 
1914, folder 190, box 21, ibid. 
to act upon together.  Any other relation is unsound and if you have been led into this 
move by anything that I have done or have failed to do in connection with the affairs, that 
I have had a pretty active part in that company, it is but right between us, that I am made 
acquainted with it.  While I am more than willing to send in my resignation to Mr 
Welborn, I am not willing to do so if under criticism, without facing whatever it may be 
that brings such a request at this time, and by whom it is inspired.”
18
  JDR Jr., though, 
maintained the pretext “that only through [Bowers'] complete withdrawal from official 
connection with the Company would the full measure of responsibility be assumed by the 
officers.”
19
  His final letter to Bowers on the subject of the latter's resignation concluded 
that “This has been an interesting experience, and I trust that good will come from it.”
20
If Bowers was to emerge as one of the big losers of the conflict, JDR, Jr. faced a 
more ambiguous legacy.  The memory of Ludlow continues to tarnish his name into the 
present, yet Ludlow also inspired in him a change in heart through which he would 
eventually add new gloss to the Rockefeller shine.  He also reaped the reward of tens of 
millions of dollars worth of CF&I stocks and bonds from his father.  Somewhat 
perversely, Sr. expressed his pride in his son on four separate occasions -- after Jr.'s 
testimony before the House Committee on Mines and Mining in April, 1914, after his 
testimony before the Committee on Industrial Relations in January and May of 1915, and 
upon his return from his famous Colorado visit in October, 1915 -- by giving him 
securities.
21
  Ever the grateful son, Jr. wrote his father that “Just plain ‘Thank you’ 
sounds so insufficient, so heartless and so inexpressive, in comparison with the deep 
feelings of love and gratitude which I have in my heart for you.  Words can never express 
these feelings.  My only hope is that in my life and the things which I undertake to do, I 
                                                 
18  Bowers to JDR, Jr., folder 190, box 21, ibid. 
19  JDR, Jr. to Bowers, folder 190, box 21, ibid. 
20  ibid. 
21  e.g. JDR, Sr. to JDR, Jr., 24 May 1915, folder 504, box 58, Fosdick Research Files, Business 
Interest Series, RG II 2 Z, OMR, RAC. 
can prove to you my gratitude and my profound appreciation of the confidence which 
you repose in me and the unbounded love which you have ever shown me.”
22
Before returning to this crucial question of memory and legacies, perhaps the 
most important single finding of my research visit concerns the failure of one of the most 
promising attempts to settle the strike.  In November, 1913, Colorado Governor Elias 
Ammons called a conference between three mining executives, CF&I's Jesse Welborn, 
Victor-American's John C. Osgood (the man from whom the Gould-Rockefeller interests 
had acquired CF&I in 1903), and H. Brown of Rocky Mountain Fuel, and three striking 
coal miners, Archie Allison, David Hamman, and T. X. Evans.  The RAC's transcript of 
these proceedings is a fascinating and invaluable document, one whose insights I have 
only began to unpack.  The conceit behind the conference was Ammon's notion that 
operators and strikers could come to an amicable settlement if the insoluble issue of 
union recognition was taken off of the table.  During discussions that stretched late into 
the night, filling more than 200 pages, the miners, operators, and Ammons talked over 
their differences.  These conversations provide important insights into the different 
worldviews of miners and mining operators, giving the reader an excellent sense of the 
seemingly petty daily grievances that accumulated over time to fuel discontent among 
mine workers.  Allison, Hamman, and especially Evans overcame their discomfort at 
confronting powerful politicians and capitalists face-to-face.  “You understand 
gentlemen,” Allison implored, “that we are just simple miners.  We are . . . a bit awkward 
and we have not got the same expression and we would like a little consideration on 
account of that.”
23
  As they warmed to the task before them, the colliers began to express 
the spirit of independence common among skilled coal miners.  “I don’t not have to bow 
my head to any man in Colorado,” T. Evans put it, “as far as mining is concerned.”
24
  
                                                 
22  JDR, Jr., to JDR, Sr., 29 October 1915, folder 504, box 58, ibid. 
23  “Proceedings of Joint Conference.  Held in the State Capitol, Denver, Colorado, at 10 o’clock 
A. M., November 26, 1913," typescript, box 26, CF&I Papers, BI, 30. 
24  ibid., 12. 
Miners and operators alike claimed that they possessed a common interest, yet they could 
not agree upon how to distribute control over this common interest among workers and 
managers.  The conversation wound around the six planks of the union strike platform, 
but neither Ammons nor the operators could keep it from circling back to the seventh 
plank, the issue of union recognition that was not even supposed to be on the table during 
that meeting.  None of the miners were officers of the UMWA, yet all believed that any 
settlement which left the union out would fail to protect the miners' interests.  The miners 
argued that a union pit committee was the only way to solve such grievances as disputes 
between miners and foremen or so-called “dead work,” tasks ancillary to removing coal 
such as setting props or cleaning up rooms for which miners received no direct 
compensation.  The proceedings thus reveal the heart of the 1913-'14 strike to be a 
question of raw power over the workplace:  Would the mines be industrial democracies 
in which union miners wielded collective power equal to or greater than that of CF&I and 
its competitors, or would the companies continue to extend their control over work and 
workmen underground?   
Significant as issues such as scrip payments, political repression, and the 
company store system were in expanding the strike coalition and garnering public 
support for the UMWA, the arguments made in the joint conference by Evans, Allison, 
and Hamman suggest that power over what I call the mine workscape was the dominant 
factor that motivated mine workers to strike.  This is why union recognition was so 
important to them, for it insured them, they believed, a collective voice that would 
counterbalance the tremendous authority of the operators.  The governor and the 
operators alike, though, turned a deaf ear towards these arguments.  Ammons continued 
to direct the discussion toward a settlement, and even believed he had succeeded at 
forging a compromise by the end.  The miners, though, felt otherwise.  “We are in no 
position,” Evans exclaimed after Ammons believed he had forged an agreement, “without 
an organization to defend ourselves.”
25
  The joint conference failed to bring peace to the 
coalfields.  By taking union recognition off of the table, Ammons had made it possible 
for strikers and operators to sit at the same table and discuss their differences, but without 
any agreement on this issue, no settlement was possible.  After this failure, the violence 
in the coalfields would intensify until tragedy struck at Ludlow on April 20, 1914. 
Even as men, women, and children were dying in southern Colorado, union 
leaders, journalists, company officials, and others began to mold understandings and 
memories of the massacre.  This process constituted the second major component 
illuminated by my recent research.  This was the conscious effort to mold how the events 
of the massacre and strike would be conceived of and remembered.  Papers in the RAC 
document some aspects of this struggle over memory.  Some of the most interesting 
involve what later-day political observers would term “spin.”  Already addressed to some 
extent in my previous research report was 26 Broadway's decision to hire Ivy Lee to 
shape public opinion regarding the strike.  No less important were other efforts not 
initiated by the Rockefellers and their associates, but which 26 Broadway nonetheless 
aided.  Two notable cases are Jerome Greene's involvement in trying to arrange speaking 
engagements for Major Boughton of the Colorado National Guard, who insisted that no 
massacre had occurred at Ludlow, and Greene's participation in the efforts of Colorado 
conservatives to block the publication of Henry Atkinson's report on the strike to the 
Federal Council of Churches.
26
  Through these and other measures, the Rockefellers 
sought to shape public discourse regarding events in Colorado, not only through the work 
of Lee's publicity, but also through Greene's circumspect but strident efforts through the 
Rockefeller Foundation to put pro-company accounts of the massacre and strike before 
the public.  
                                                 
25  ibid., 254-5.  By this point in the day, Secretary of Labor W. B. Wilson had joined the 
conference. 
26  Charles Loughridge of Denver elicited Greene's aid on the latter issue.  See folders 146 and 
147, box 20, Series 900:  Administration, Program and Policy, 900  Organization:  Industrial 
Relations--Colorado Fuel and Iron Co. 1914-1915, RG 3, RF, RAC. 
 
